2.2 Flight Preparation
― フライトの準備 ―

NASA senior management conducts a complex series of reviews and readiness polls to monitor a missions progress toward flight readiness and eventual launch. Each step requires written certification. At the final review, called the Flight Readiness Review, NASA and its contractors certify that the necessary analyses, verification activities, and data products associated with the endorsement have been accomplished and "indicate a high probability for mission success." The review establishes the rationale for accepting any remaining identifiable risk; by signing the Certificate of Flight Readiness, NASA senior managers agree that they have accomplished all preliminary items and that they agree to accept that risk. The Launch Integration Manager oversees the flight preparation process.

STS-107 Flight Preparation Process

The flight preparation process reviews progress toward flight readiness at various junctures and ensures the organization is ready for the next operational phase. This process includes Project Milestone Reviews, three Program Milestone Reviews, and the Flight Readiness Review, where the Certification of Flight Readiness is endorsed.

The Launch Readiness Review is conducted within one month of the launch to certify that Certification of Launch Readiness items from NSTS-08117, Appendices H and Q, Flight Preparation Process Plan, have been reviewed and acted upon. The STS-107 Launch Readiness Review was held at Kennedy Space Center on December 18, 2002. The Kennedy Space Center Director of Shuttle Processing chaired the review and approved continued preparations for a January 16, 2003, launch. Onboard payload and experi-mental status and late stowage activity were reviewed.

A Flight Readiness Review, which is chaired by the Of-fice of Space Flight Associate Administrator, usually occurs about two weeks before launch and provides senior NASA management with a summary of the certification and verification of the Space Shuttle vehicle, flight crew, payloads, and rationales for accepting residual risk. In cases where the Flight Preparation Process has not been successfully completed, Certification of Flight Readiness exceptions will be made, and presented at the Pre-Launch Mission Management Team Review for disposition. The final Flight Readiness Review for STS-107 was held on January 9, 2003, a week prior to launch. Representatives of all organizations except Flight Crew, Ferry Readiness, and Department of Defense Space Shuttle Support made presentations. Safety, Reliability & Quality Assurance summarized the work performed on the Ball Strut Tie Rod Assembly crack, defective booster connector pin, booster separation motor propellant paint chip contamination, and STS-113 Main Engine 1 nozzle leak (see Appendix E.1 for the briefing charts). None of the work performed on these items affected the launch.

Certificate of Flight Readiness: No actions were assigned during the Flight Readiness Review. One exception was included in the Certificate of Flight Readiness pending the completion of testing on the Ball Strut Tie Rod Assembly.

Testing was to be completed on January 15. This exception was to be closed with final flight rationale at the STS-107 Pre-launch Mission Management Team meeting. All principal managers and organizations indicated their readiness to support the mission.

Normally, a Mission Management Team - consisting of managers from Engineering, System Integration, the Space Flight Operations Contract Office, the Shuttle Safety Office, and the Johnson Space Center directors of flight crew opera-tions, mission operations, and space and life sciences - convenes two days before launch and is maintained until the Orbiter safely lands. The Mission Management Team Chair reports directly to the Shuttle Program Manager.

The Mission Management Team resolves outstanding problems outside the responsibility or authority of the Launch and Flight Directors. During pre-launch, the Mission Management Team is chaired by the Launch Integration Manager at Kennedy Space Center, and during flight by the Space Shuttle Program Integration Manager at Johnson Space Center. The guiding document for Mission Manage-ment operations is NSTS 07700, Volume VIII.
ミッションマネジメントチームは、打上げ/フライトの両ディレクターの責任外ないし権限外の未解決の問題を決議します。ミッションマネジメントチームは打上げ前には、ケネディ宇宙センターの打上げ統合マネージャーが議長を務め、フライトの間はジョンソン宇宙センターのスペースシャトルプログラム統合マネージャーが同職につきます。ミッションマネジメントの運営については、NSTS 0770、第8巻に記載されています。

A Pre-launch Mission Management Team Meeting occurs one or two days before launch to assess any open items or changes since the Flight Readiness Review, provide a GO/NO-GO decision on continuing the countdown, and approve changes to the Launch Commit Criteria. Simul-taneously, the Mission Management Team is activated to evaluate the countdown and address any issues remaining from the Flight Readiness Review. STS-107s Pre-launch Mission Management Team meeting, chaired by the Acting Manager of Launch Integration, was held on January 14, some 48 hours prior to launch, at the Kennedy Space Center. In addition to the standard topics, such as weather and range support, the Pre-Launch Mission Management Team was updated on the status of the Ball Strut Tie Rod Assem-bly testing. The exception would remain open pending the presentation of additional test data at the Delta Pre-Launch Mission Management Team review the next day.

The Delta Pre-Launch Mission Management Team Meeting was also chaired by the Acting Manager of Launch Integration and met at 9:00 a.m. EST on January 15 at the Kennedy Space Center. The major issues addressed concerned the Ball Strut Tie Rod Assembly and potential strontium chromate contamination found during routine inspection of a (non-STS-107) spacesuit on January 14. The contamination concern was addressed and a toxicology analysis determined there was no risk to the STS-107 crew. A poll of the principal managers and organizations indicated all were ready to support STS-107.

A Pre-Tanking Mission Management Team Meeting was also chaired by the Acting Manager of Launch Integra-tion. This meeting was held at 12:10 a.m. on January 16. A problem with the Solid Rocket Booster External Tank At-tachment ring was addressed for the first time. Recent mission life capability testing of the material in the ring plates revealed static strength properties below minimum requirements. There were concerns that, assuming worst-case flight environments, the ring plate would not meet the safety factor requirement of 1.4 - that is, able to withstand 1.4 times the maximum load expected in operation. Based on analysis of the anticipated flight environment for STS-107, the need to meet the safety factor requirement of 1.4 was waived (see Chapter 10). No Launch Commit Criteria violations were noted, and the STS-107 final countdown began. The loading of propellants into the External Tank was delayed by some 70 minutes, until seven hours and 20 minutes before launch, due to an extended fuel cell calibration, a liquid oxygen replenish valve problem, and a Launch Processing System reconfiguration. The countdown continued normally, and at T-9 minutes the Launch Mission Management Team was polled for a GO/NO-GO launch decision. All members re-ported GO, and the Acting Manager of Launch Integration gave the final GO launch decision.
燃料充填前ミッションマネジメントチームミーティングも同じく、打上げ総合マネージャー代理によって取り仕切られ、1月16日12:10AMに行われました。まず、固体燃料ロケットブースターと外部燃料タンクを接続するリングについて議論が行われました。これは、リングプレートの素材に関する直近のミッション遂行能力テスト(mission life capability testing)によると、静的な強度の値が要求値を下回っていた事に関するものです。この件については、飛行中の最悪のケースでも、リングプレートは必要とされる安全係数1.4に達することはないと判断されました。この安全係数とは予測される最大荷重の1.4倍の荷重に耐えることを意味します。しかし、STS-107の飛行状態を予測した分析によって、この安全係数1.4という数値は撤回されることになりました(第10章を参照してください)。打上げ規準への違反はなく、STS-107への最終カウントダウンが始められました。外部燃料タンクへの燃料の充填は70分遅れ、打上げの7時間20分前までかかりました。これは拡張された燃料電池の調整、液体酸素補充バルブの問題、そして打上げ進行システムの再調整によるものです。カウントダウンは通常通り行われ、T-9分には打上げミッションマネジメントチームによって打上げのGO/NO-GO(実行/中止)の関する投票が行われ、全員がGOに投票し、打上げ統合マネージャー代理が打上げに対して最終的なGOの判断を下しました。

Once the Orbiter clears the launch pad, responsibility passes from the Launch Director at the Kennedy Space Center to the Flight Director at Johnson Space Center. During flight, the mission is also evaluated from an engineering perspective in the Mission Evaluation Room, which is managed by Vehicle Engineering Office personnel. Any engineering analysis conducted during a mission is coordinated through and first presented to the Mission Evaluation Room, and is then presented by the Mission Evaluation Room manager to the Mission Management Team.

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